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Abstract: The Labour leadership contest of 2015 resulted in the election of the veteran Left-
wing backbencher, Jeremy Corbyn, who clearly defeated the early favourite, Andy Burnham. 
Yet Corbyn enjoyed very little support among Labour MPs, and his victory plunged the PLP 
into turmoil, particularly as he was widely viewed as incapable of leading the Party to victory 
in the 2020 general election. Given that much of the established academic literature on Party 
leadership contests emphasises the ability to foster unity, and thereby render a party electable, 
as two of the key criteria for electing a new leader, coupled with overall competence, 
important questions are raised about how and why the Labour Party chose someone to lead 
them who clearly does not meet these criteria. We will argue that while these are the natural 
priorities of MPs when electing a new leader, in Corbyn's case, much of the extra-
parliamentary Labour Party was more concerned about ideological conviction and purity of 
principles, regardless of how far these diverged from public opinion. This was especially true 
of those who signed-up to the Labour Party following the 2015 general election defeat. 
Indeed, many of these only did so after Corbyn had become a candidate. This clearly suggests 
a serious tension between maximising intra-party democracy and ensuring the electability of 
the parliamentary party itself. 
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 This was the front-page headline of The Independent on 23 July 2015.  
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The Labour Party has long been viewed by most of its members as a democratic socialist 
party, but this clearly has two meanings. The first is that the Party seeks to create a 
democratic socialist society, in which wealth and power are widely shared, and equality is a 
primary objective. The second meaning is that Labour is a democratic party in terms of the 
participatory role played by its members. However, this second definition immediately raises 
a problem when applied to the election of Labour Party leaders, namely whether they should 
be elected solely by the MPs who they will lead and work with on a daily basis in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), or by the extra-parliamentary Party, whose members often 
play such a vital role in constituencies and the workplace, and who also make a major 
collective contribution to the Party's funding.  
 
Since the creation of an Electoral College in 1980, the Labour Party has opted to involve the 
extra-parliamentary membership in its leadership contests, but this has often revealed a 
tension between the preferences of Labour MPs, and those of the extra-parliamentary 
members in the constituency parties and affiliated trade unions. For example, in the second 
round of Labour’s 1981 Deputy Leadership contest between Denis Healey and Tony Benn, 
the latter was supported by 81% of Constituency Labour Parties (who were much more Left-
wing overall), but only 34% of Labour MPs: Healey won the contest by 50.4% to 49.6%. 
Much more recently, in 2010, Ed Miliband narrowly defeated his brother David, in the 
Labour leadership contest, largely due to the support he received from trade union members, 
even though David Miliband was much more popular among Labour MPs themselves, and 
would probably have proven rather more attractive or politically credible to the British 
electorate.  
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The disjuncture between the preferences of the PLP and the extra-parliamentary Labour Party 
was most recently (and vividly) illustrated during the summer of 2015, when Jeremy Corbyn 
was dramatically elected as leader of the Labour Party, in spite of enjoying very little support 
among Labour MPs themselves. Instead, he won the 2015 Labour leadership contest largely 
by virtue of the votes of individuals who had only registered as Labour Party members, 
affiliates or supporters (categories discussed below) following the Party's defeat in May 2015. 
Indeed, many of these new recruits only signed-up once Corbyn had declared his candidature. 
Moreover, many of these extra-parliamentary new recruits who supported Corbyn had not 
even voted for Labour in the 2015 general election. For the second time in five years, the PLP 
found itself being led by a Left-wing leader whose support originated almost entirely from 
outside the PLP.  
 
The purpose of this article is thus to explain how Jeremy Corbyn was elected as Labour Party 
leader in September 2015, from where and whom his support emanated, and why he attracted 
this support. In so doing, we will highlight the divergence between the criteria usually 
adopted by Labour parliamentarians when electing a new leader, and the qualities sought by 
much of the extra-parliamentary membership. Whereas the established academic literature 
emphasises the importance of party unity, electability and policy competence as the three key 
criteria for leadership candidates, we argue that these are the attributes usually (and 
understandably) prioritised by MPs themselves.  
 
By contrast, as Corbyn's election highlights, extra-parliamentary members, and particularly a 
party's rank-and-file activists, are much more likely to be motivated by other considerations 
in determining who would be a 'good' party leader, and consequently prioritise different 
criteria, most notably ideological stance and concomitant commitment to core principles and 
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policies. Of course, this runs the serious risk that they will vote for a leadership candidate 
who is neither supported by the Party's MPs, nor popular among voters in general, thus 
rendering the party virtually unelectable: ideologically pure, but politically impotent.   
    
 
When Labour MPs chose their leader 
 
Until 1980, the Labour leader was elected exclusively by the Party’s MPs. Prospective 
leadership candidates had to declare themselves at the outset and a series of eliminative (and 
secret) ballots would then follow until one of them achieved an overall majority. The 
rationale for this system was twofold. First, it was simple and efficient, in that it would yield 
a decisive result in a short period of time. Second, it was seen as imperative that the leader 
should enjoy the confidence of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP).  
 
The post of ‘Chairman’ of the PLP was held by a succession of MPs until 1922, when it 
evolved into that of ‘Leader of the PLP’ to reflect the change in the Party’s parliamentary 
status. After the General Election of that year, Labour became the second largest party in the 
House of Commons and was consequently obliged to fill the office of Leader of the 
Opposition. Ramsay MacDonald was duly elected, having challenged and defeated the 
incumbent Chairman, John Clynes. In 1931, 1932 and 1935, a single candidate was ‘elected’ 
unopposed. In 1935, Clement Attlee was re-elected on the second ballot. In 1955, Hugh 
Gaitskell was elected on the first. In 1960 and 1961, Gaitskell was challenged by Harold 
Wilson and Anthony Greenwood respectively and was comfortably re-elected on each 
occasion.  
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The next three contests involved three or more candidates, but each was effectively a two-
horse race between ‘left’ and ‘right’. Even discounting the challenges of 1960 and 1961 – 
both won with predictable ease by the incumbent – contests held under this system were not 
especially competitive, but by 1980 had become progressively more so, the winner’s vote 
share in the final ballot being lower in 1955, 1963, 1976 and 1980 than that of his 
predecessor. 
 
 
Table 1: PLP leadership elections 1922-1980  
 
Year Number of 
candidates 
 
 
Ballots required Winner’s share of final 
vote (%) 
1922 2 1 MacDonald             52.1 
1931 1 - Henderson                - 
1932 1 - Lansbury                    - 
1935 1 - Attlee                          - 
1935 3 2 Attlee                       66.7 
1955 3 1 Gaitskell                  58.8 
1960 2 1 Gaitskell                  67.2 
1961 2 1 Gaitskell                  74.3 
1963 3 2 Wilson                     58.3 
1976 6 3 Callaghan                56.2 
1980 4 2 Foot                         51.9 
 
 
 
After 1935, Labour leaders held the position for long periods and were seldom forced to seek 
re-election. In 1976, Henry Drucker (1976, p. 378) noted that ‘Once Labour elects a Leader, 
it is noticeably reluctant to remove him’. This reluctance has been explained with reference to 
the Party’s ‘ethos’ (Drucker, 1979) and/or leader-eviction rules. High nomination barriers, 
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and the requirement to challenge an incumbent directly, have made Labour leaders, once 
elected, relatively secure (Quinn, 2005). When a vacancy did arise, the ‘favourite’ and early 
front-runner almost always went on to win (Drucker, 1976, 1981; Stark, 1996; Heppell, 
2010a; Heppell et al, 2010; Heppell and Crines, 2011). 
 
In 1968, Gunnar Sjoblom (1968) identified three strategic goals for parties operating in 
parliamentary systems: to remain united, win elections and implement policies. Adopting this 
framework, Stark (1996: 125) argues that, during a leadership contest, these goals are 
translated into criteria by which all candidates are assessed, a party’s principal aim being to 
choose a leader who will maintain (or restore) party unity. Hence, ‘acceptability’ to all major 
party factions is the first-order criterion, yet ‘only in extraordinary circumstances’ does the 
unity goal become an explicit consideration. One example of this, Stark argues, occurred in 
1980, when the veteran left-winger, Michael Foot, defeated Denis Healey. That Foot was 
considered the candidate who could best unite the Party ‘spoke volumes’ about the situation 
in which Labour found itself at the time (Stark, 1996: 128. See also, Drucker, 1981; Heppell 
and Crines, 2011). 
 
More often than not, however, candidates for the party leadership are judged by their 
perceived ability to win a General Election and lead a successful administration. Hence, 
‘electability’ is the second-order criterion and ‘competence’ the third.  In 1963, Wilson was 
seen as superior to his two opponents, Brown and Callaghan, on all three criteria. In 1976, 
Callaghan was chosen to succeed Wilson, again on all three counts (Stark, 1996; Drucker, 
1976; Heppell, 2010a; Heppell et al, 2010). 
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The Electoral College 
 
Between 1983 and 2010, Labour elected its Leader via a tripartite Electoral College, 
comprising the PLP, constituency Labour parties (CLPs) and affiliated organisations, 
principally trade unions. The new system represented the culmination of a long campaign to 
‘bring the Party elite under greater grass-roots control after the perceived failures of the 
Callaghan government’ (Quinn, 2004: 333). After much debate, it was eventually agreed that 
30 per cent of the votes would go to the PLP, 30 per cent to CLPs and 40 per cent to the trade 
unions and other affiliated bodies. As in the past, only MPs were entitled to stand. Any MP, 
CLP member or affiliate could nominate a candidate, who would then need the endorsement 
of 5 per cent of the PLP.  
 
Of the five contests held between 1983 and 2010, three (1983, 1992 and 2010) followed the 
incumbent’s resignation and one (1994) his death. Only one (1988) was a challenge to the 
incumbent; as in 1960 and 1961, it failed. The original nomination threshold for candidates 
was subsequently raised to 20 per cent of the PLP, for challenges and vacancies alike. This 
presented problems in 1992, when Bryan Gould struggled to win sufficient nominations, and 
the rule was changed again in 1993. The threshold for challenges remained at 20 per cent, but 
for contests arising from vacancies, candidates now required nominations from only 12.5 per 
cent of the PLP, making it easier (in theory) for more contestants to stand (Quinn, 2004: 338-
39). The most controversial feature of the Electoral College as initially configured was the 
role of the trade unions, whose concentration of block votes could firmly establish a 
candidate as a ‘front-runner’. The new system increased the power of union leaders and 
officials and led to claims that they were ‘king-makers’ (Quinn, 2004: 340). It also, of course, 
enabled Labour's political opponents and critics to claim that the Party's leaders were 
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beholden to the unions, and thus unable to govern in the national interest or take tough, but 
necessary, decisions which were not supported by their union supporters.  
 
When the Labour Party lost the 1992 general election, its relationship with the unions was 
placed under close scrutiny, with many leading figures - particularly those who soon became 
associated with New Labour - arguing that Labour's close links with the trade unions had 
been a significant reason for Labour's defeat. Often citing responses from post-election focus 
groups, Labour's self-proclaimed 'modernisers' argued that the Party was widely viewed as 
beholden to a backward-looking, change-resistant, sectional interest, and out-of-touch with 
the ambitions and aspirations of many voters in a post-industrial society (Wring, 2007: 81-82. 
See also Minkin, 1992, 678. Weir, 1992).  
 
The National Executive Committee (NEC) established a review into the operation of the 
Electoral College, and duly recommended a new procedure, whereby the PLP, CLPs and 
affiliated bodies would each receive an equal (one-third) share of the vote (Alderman and 
Carter, 1994; Webb, 1995). Block voting was abolished and replaced by a system of postal 
ballots, on the basis of one levy-payer, one vote (OLOV). CLP block voting was similarly 
abolished. Instead, individual Party members would now participate in a postal ballot – One 
Member, One Vote (OMOV). Voting procedures for the PLP section were unchanged, except 
that Labour Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) would now have equal voting 
rights to their Westminster counterparts.  
 
In theory, these changes would significantly reduce the power of union leaders and officials. 
The need for candidates to secure the votes of individual Party members and union levy-
payers meant that the media – especially television – would play an increasingly important 
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role. In a recalibration of the Electoral College’s initial configuration, the vote of an 
individual MP or MEP was now worth the same as that of several hundred CLP members or 
several thousand union levy-payers, thus returning primary importance in future contests to 
the PLP, in terms of its ‘gate-keeping’ powers over nominations and its ability to shape the 
contest as a whole. Despite this, a candidate who trailed another in respect of backing from 
the PLP ‘could still triumph’ once Party members’ and/or union levy-payers’ votes were 
aggregated and counted (Quinn, 2004, p. 345). As we explain below, this duly happened in 
the leadership contest of 2010. 
 
Between 1983 and 2010, there were six Labour Party leadership contests and successions. In 
1988 and 1992, the former being a challenge to the incumbent, there were two candidates and 
in 2007, only one. On the other three occasions (1983, 1994 and 2010), there were three or 
more.  
 
 
Table 2: Electoral College leadership elections 1983-2010 
 
Year Number of 
candidates 
 
 
Rounds  required Winner’s share of final 
vote (%) 
1983 4 1 Kinnock                   71.3 
1988 2 1 Kinnock                   88.6 
1992 2 1 Smith                       91.0 
1994 3 1 Blair                         57.0 
2007 1 - Brown                         - 
2010 5 4 E. Miliband             50.7 
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In 2007, Gordon Brown was ‘elected’ unopposed. On three other occasions, including Tony 
Benn’s challenge to Neil Kinnock in 1988, the winner’s vote share exceeded 70 per cent and, 
with the exception of Kinnock’s more modest (49.3 per cent) support among MPs in 1983, he 
also secured an equivalent (or greater) proportion in all three sections. In 1994, Tony Blair 
also achieved a majority of votes in all three sections, but his overall vote share was 
significantly lower than that of Kinnock in 1983 and John Smith in 1992, and similar to that 
of Gaitskell, Wilson and Callaghan, when the decision had rested with MPs alone.  
 
By contrast, the leadership election of 2010 proved to be Labour’s most competitive to date. 
There were five candidates, but the contest was effectively a two-horse race between the 
‘favourite’ and early front-runner, David Miliband, and his younger brother, Ed. After four 
months of campaigning, Ed Miliband won by the narrowest of margins. Throughout, David 
Miliband remained the first choice of the PLP and Party members, but Ed’s far superior 
support in the affiliates’ section, combined with the larger number of second preference votes 
he received in the PLP and CLP sections, proved decisive (Dorey and Denham, 2011; Jobson 
and Wickham-Jones, 2011; Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013). 
 
Prior to 2010, all four Electoral College contests were won decisively by the ‘favourite’ and 
early ‘front-runner’. In 1983, Kinnock’s ‘soft-left’ approach and refusal to serve in the 
Wilson and Callaghan governments made him far more ‘acceptable’ than his nearest rival, 
Roy Hattersley, to the Party as a whole. In 1988, Kinnock was seen as the strongest candidate 
on all three of Stark’s criteria (‘acceptability’, ‘electability’ and ‘competence’), as was Smith 
in 1992 and Blair in 1994 (Stark, 1996; Drucker, 1984; Alderman and Carter, 1993, 1995). In 
2010, David Miliband was seen, according to the opinion polls, as the strongest candidate in 
terms of ‘electability’ and ‘competence’, but was clearly not ‘acceptable’ to the leaders of the 
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three largest trade unions (Dorey and Denham, 2011; Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; 
Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013). Of the two, Ed ultimately proved to be (marginally) 
more ‘acceptable’ to the Electoral College as a whole. 
 
 
Constant controversy over Ed Miliband's election 
 
From the moment his election as Labour Party leader was announced, Ed Miliband faced 
relentless criticism, and thus struggled both to establish his authority over the PLP and win 
the respect of the British public. Two of the most trenchant criticisms levelled against him 
concerned his decision to stand as a candidate in the first place, and the source of much of his 
support. 
 
With regard to his decision to put himself forward as a candidate, and thereby compete 
against his brother David, Ed Miliband was variously accused of selfishly and ruthlessly 
placing his own leadership ambitions above those of his brother, and in so doing, grievously 
damaging the Labour Party's chances of electoral recovery: here at least, blood did not run 
thicker than water. Many such critics were convinced that David Miliband was the candidate 
most likely to 'reconnect' the Party with voters, and thereby restore its credibility and 
popularity before the 2015 general election. As such, Ed Miliband was subsequently 
condemned for effectively denying his brother the Labour leadership, and in so doing, deeply 
damaging the Party's chances of electoral recovery. 
 
However, there was a second substantive criticism of Ed Miliband's victory, namely that it 
had largely accrued from the trade union votes in Labour's tripartite Electoral College, 
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particularly those unions representing public sector workers (Bagehot, 2010; Oakeshott, 
Woolf and Watts, 2010). While this provided a constant source of political ammunition for 
the Conservatives and their press allies to attack Miliband with throughout his leadership 
(see, for example: Martin, 2014; Martin, 2015; Ross, 2013), it also ensured that when he 
criticised the Coalition Government's public sector reforms and cutbacks, this was invariably 
cited as evidence that he was merely acting on behalf of his (public sector) trade union 
supporters and paymasters. This criticism also implied that in the highly unlikely that Ed 
Miliband became Prime Minister, his alleged subservience to public sector trade unions 
would prevent him from taking decisions in the national interest, especially when cuts in 
public expenditure were required  
 
These two problems were compounded by the media's merciless mocking both of Ed 
Miliband's appearance - the cruel [Wallace and] Gromit comparisons - and his repeated 
failure to communicate effectively to voters via his speeches, some of which sounded as if 
they had been written by policy wonks, and which therefore reinforced a widespread public 
perception that Ed Miliband and his entourage were out-of-touch with ordinary people: part 
of an insular North London liberal elite. By contrast, although there was no great public love 
for the Conservatives, David Cameron did at least appear to be articulate, assured, and most 
important of all, 'Prime Ministerial'. He inspired a calm confidence and credibility which Ed 
Miliband could never remotely convey. 
 
Reforming Labour's Electoral College 
 
Sensitive to the repeated allegation that he had won the Party's leadership election by virtue 
of the trade union component of Labour's electoral college, and inter alia that the trade 
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unions continued to exercise too much influence in the Labour Party, both organisationally 
and financially, Miliband initiated a major review of the Party's internal processes and 
mechanisms for candidate (s)election, and the relationship between the Labour Party and 
various categories of membership. This unavoidably included careful consideration of the 
operation of the Electoral College used for Labour leadership contests, and the manner in 
which the votes of affiliated trade unions were counted.   
 
However, there was another more specific impetus for this review, namely an acrimonious 
and well-publicised dispute over the selection of Labour's prospective parliamentary 
candidate in Falkirk, in 2013. In this instance, it was alleged that the Unite trade union had 
sought to 'rig' the ballot to ensure that its preferred candidate was adopted, whereupon an 
argument ensued between Unite and senior Labour Party figures at national-level – which 
was naturally given prominence by pro-Conservative newspapers (Chapman, 2014; Patel 
2013). Although an internal inquiry into the episode subsequently exonerated Unite of any 
malpractice, Miliband clearly felt that the well-publicised episode had reminded voters of the 
close links between the Labour Party and the trade unions, and the sometimes embarrassing 
role of the latter in the Party's candidate selection process, and ultimately, Labour's leadership 
contests. He thus announced an immediate review into Labour's candidate selection 
procedures, and in particular, the role played by - and inter alia, the Party's relationship with - 
the trade unions (Miliband, 2013).  
 
Chaired by Lord (Ray) Collins, the review resulted in a radical report being published in 
February 2014, which recommended the abolition of Labour's Electoral College, with its 
three equally-weighted institutional components; Labour MPs and MEPs, Constituency 
Labour Parties (CLPs), and affiliated trade unions. Instead, it was proposed that this should 
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be superseded by a system based on the principle of One Member One Vote (OMOV), and 
that voting in future Labour leadership contests should be dependent on an individual 
belonging to one of three categories: fully-paid up members of the Party, affiliated supporters 
and registered supporters.    
 
The 'affiliated supporters' would be those who belonged to organisations which were 
themselves affiliated to the Labour Party, such as trade unions, but rather than being 
automatically eligible to vote in Labour leadership contests by virtue of paying the political 
levy via their trade union, they would need to register – at no extra cost – to become 
'affiliated supporters', whereupon they would acquire the right vote in Labour leadership 
contests (Collins, 2014: 23).      
 
The third category, that of 'registered supporter', had been proposed in an earlier review – 
Refounding Labour – of the Party's extra-parliamentary organisational structure and modus 
operandi. In particular, this had examined ways in which the Labour Party could both give 
existing members a more constructive and meaningful role at local level, and how it could re-
establish itself more extensively and firmly in local communities. One method for achieving 
the latter objective was to create a category of 'registered supporter' of the Labour Party, 
which would entail payment of a nominal fee, accompanied by a formal declaration that they 
fully supported the Party's values. It was envisaged that 'registered supporters' would often be 
'people in their local community who back Labour, but are not members of the party' (Labour 
Party, 2011: 15). The Collins report subsequently recommended that these 'registered 
supporters' should also be entitled to vote in Labour leadership elections.  
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This new system for electing Labour Party leaders meant that neither the trade unions nor the 
Party's MPs retained their former influence or impact, whereby they had collectively 
constituted one-third each of the Electoral College, with Constituency Labour Parties 
comprising the other third. Instead, each participant would have one vote, regardless of their 
category of membership: MP, affiliated supporter or registered supporter. In this respect, each 
member or supporter of the Labour Party would be equal in terms of having one vote, but of 
course, it considerably increased the influence and proportional strength of the extra-
parliamentary Party, because it ensured that potentially 100,000s of affiliated or registered 
supporters would each cast a vote, along with the Party's 232 MPs. On the other hand, the 
greatly reduced voting weight ascribed to Labour MPs was matched by the corresponding 
reduction in the trade unions' former role in the Electoral College.  
 
Crucially, though, Labour MPs retained their role as the sole selectors - gate-keepers - of who 
the candidates would be in the first place, before the Party’s extra-parliamentary electorate 
cast their votes. On this last point, the Collins Report recommended that MPs who wished to 
stand for election to the Labour leadership (and Deputy leadership) should secure the 
nominations of at least 15% of the Party's MPs (Collins, 2014: 27), a slight increase from the 
erstwhile 12.5% requirement, but somewhat less than the 20% initially favoured by Ed 
Miliband (Wintour, 2014).    
 
There was no change, however, to the electoral system used for the leadership contest itself, 
namely the Alternative Vote. As such, Labour's full members, affiliated members and 
registered supporters would each be required to rank the candidates in order of preference. If 
any candidate received more than 50% of the first-preference votes, they would win outright, 
but if this target was not attained after the first preferences had been tallied, the candidate 
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who received the fewest first-preference votes would be eliminated, whereupon the second-
preference declared by their supporters would be distributed to the remaining candidates: a 
method of election once derided by Winston Churchill as entailing  'the most worthless votes 
given for the most worthless candidates' (Hansard, 1931: Vol.253, col,106). This process 
would be repeated until one of the candidates had amassed more than 50% of the overall 
votes.   
 
 
The candidates step forward – and occasionally back again 
 
When leadership elections immediately follow a major electoral defeat, they are almost 
inevitably a de facto inquest into why the Party lost. After all, the policy platform which each 
candidate campaigns on will reflect their conclusions about why the policies recently offered 
were evidently unpopular, or lacked credibility, with the voters who had recently shunned the 
Party at the polls, and thus why a new tranche of policies was urgently needed. In Labour's 
2010 leadership contest, the Party, its candidates and their supporters had clearly been 
divided in their interpretation of why that year's general election had been lost; some thought 
that it was because the New Labour 'project' had run its course, and could no longer solve 
Britain's economic and social problems, while others were convinced that Gordon Brown had 
not adhered sufficiently closely to the New Labour 'ethos', having diluted it when he 
succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister (see, for example: Abbot, 2010: 5-7; Balls, 2010; 
Blair, 2010; 680-61; Burnham, 2010; Mandelson, 2010; Miliband, D, 2010; Miliband, E, 
2010).  
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In 2015, however, there was an apparent consensus among many of the initial leadership 
contenders that Labour's surprisingly heavy defeat was largely due to Ed Miliband having 
pulled the Party too far to the Left since 2010 (Pickard, 2015). This is not to deny that some 
individual policies and positions were quite popular (such as a proposed 'mansion tax' whose 
revenues could yield extra funds for the NHS, a higher minimum wage, and partial 
renationalisation of the railways - but there was also a concern (apparently shared by many 
voters) that Miliband's Labour Party lacked an overall vision or 'narrative' about what it stood 
for overall. Perhaps more damagingly, approval of these ostensibly Left-wing policies was 
countered by a widespread perception that Labour was hostile to big business and wealth 
creators, and had nothing to offer aspirational working-class and middle-class voters for 
whom the sundry speeches passionately denouncing inequality, poverty, predatory capitalism 
and zero-hours contracts failed to strike a chord (see, for example, Bond, 2015; Yvette 
Cooper, quoted in BBC, 2015a; Feeney, 2015). Labour was apparently on the side of those 
'left behind' or struggling, rather than those who wanted to 'get ahead' or were prospering. 
 
This perspective was trenchantly articulated, just a couple of days after the general election 
result, by one of the first Labour MPs to declare his candidature, Chuka Umunna. His 
analysis of Labour's crushing election defeat was that: 
 
We spoke to our core voters but not to aspirational, middle-class ones. We talked 
about the bottom and top of society, about the minimum wage and zero-hour 
contracts, about mansions...But we had too little to say to the majority of people in 
the middle. 
We allowed the impression to arise that we were not on the side of those who are 
doing well. We talked a lot – quite rightly – about the need to address 
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'irresponsible' capitalism, for more political will to tackle inequality, poverty and 
injustice ... But we talked too little about those creating wealth and doing the right 
thing. 
                                                                                                                (Umunna, 2015) 
 
He subsequently argued that Labour had to 'move beyond its comfort zone and find new ways 
of realising its age-old goals of equality and freedom', not only because the scale and speed of 
economic and technological changes necessitated new thinking about how to create a fairer 
society, but because the scale of Labour's 2015 election defeat clearly showed that the 
electorate did not want the type of 'socialism' promoted by Ed Miliband (quoted in Wintour, 
2015). Umunna also denounced the Left for responding to the catastrophic defeat by blaming 
the electorate for being wrong, rather than calmly and maturely listening to what the voters 
were saying, and learning the appropriate lessons. Umunna suggested that some on the Left 
were 'behaving like a petulant child who has been told you can’t have the sweeties in the 
sweetshop, you can’t have power. And now we’re running around stamping our feet, 
screaming at the electorate' (quoted in Dathan, 2015). 
 
However, Umunna withdrew his candidature after just three days, for personal reasons, 
whereupon he declared his support for Liz Kendall, whose prognosis of Labour's electoral 
defeat seemed to mirror his, and was commonly characterised as an unequivocally New 
Labour' or Blairite perspective. Kendall was also endorsed by the Shadow Education 
Secretary, Tristram Hunt, who himself withdrew from the leadership contest, albeit because 
he failed to attract the requisite 35 nominations from his fellow Labour MPs. A further 
withdrawal from the contest due to lack of support among their parliamentary colleagues was 
Mary Creagh, and although she refrained from openly endorsing any of the other candidates, 
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she similarly insisted that the Labour Party had to become much more supportive of small 
businesses, entrepreneurs and wealth-creators, which was widely construed as a tacit 
endorsement of Kendall and her Blairite prognosis of Labour's recent defeat. Indeed, 28 of 
Kendall's 41 nominees had backed the ‘Blairite’ candidate, David Miliband, in Labour's 2010 
leadership contest.   
 
These withdrawals meant that when nominations closed on 15 June, there were four 
contestants, as illustrated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: The four contenders 
 
Candidate            Number of nominations     % of PLP 
Andy Burnham                68                                29.3 
Yvette Cooper                59                                25.4 
Jeremy Corbyn                36                                15.5 
Liz Kendall                         41                                 17.7 
 
Ironically, Jeremy Corbyn had struggled to attract the requisite (35) nominations, to the 
extent that he narrowly exceeded this threshold just minutes before the deadline. To 
compound the irony, one of Corbyn's nominations was provided by Andy Burnham himself, 
in a spirit of comradeship intended to ensure that the leadership contest encompassed views 
from across the ideological spectrum of the parliamentary Party, and thus facilitating a full 
and frank debate about how Labour should respond to its crushing defeat. At this juncture, 
hardly anyone, inside the parliamentary Labour Party or beyond, viewed Corbyn as a credible 
contender, but merely a make-weight maverick to provide the Left with a symbolic candidate 
- or 'token leftie' as Bale and Webb (2015) described him - and facilitate a semblance of a 
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debate in which views from across the Party's ideological spectrum would be expressed. 
Other Labour MPs who backed Corbyn's candidature included Diane Abbott, Margaret 
Beckett, Ronnie Campbell, John Cruddas, Frank Field, John McDonnell, Michael Meacher 
and Dennis Skinner. However, under Labour’s leadership contest rules, nominating a 
candidate does not obligate the nominee to vote for that MP in the final ballot, and as such, 
up to 14 MPs who formally nominated Corbyn subsequently voted for one of the other 
candidates. Indeed, Beckett later described herself as 'a moron' for having nominated Corbyn 
in the first place (Hope, 2015a).   
 
Certainly, the initial front-runner was Andy Burnham, not just in terms of having attracted the 
most nominations among Labour MPs, but also because sundry opinion polls deemed him to 
be the most popular or credible candidate both among Labour voters and, crucially, the public 
(electorate) in general. This was illustrated by an Ipsos-MORI poll which was conducted 
immediately after the close of nominations, when the four contenders were finally declared, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Initial support for the four Labour leadership contenders (%) 
 
                                     Burnham        Cooper         Corbyn         Kendall            
 
Labour supporters            36.5               31.7             14.3              17.5  
 
The public                        33                  31                11                 25          
 
Source: Ipsos-MORI, published in The Evening Standard 18 June 2015. 
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However, 37% of Labour supporters did not express a preference, suggesting either that they 
were not overly enthused by any of the four candidates, or that they intended to listen 
diligently to what the contenders said during the summer-long campaign, prior to making an 
informed decision. Meanwhile, among the general public – or, rather, the 45% who stated a 
preference – Burnham enjoyed only a two per cent lead over Cooper, while Corbyn’s public 
support barely made it into double digits. However, the most notable divergence between 
Labour Party supporters and the public was the latter’s stronger support for Liz Kendall. In 
effect, the electorate seemed rather less keen for the Party to herald a break with New Labour 
and Blairism than did Labour Party supporters. This, of course, was to render the final result 
of Labour's leadership contest even more remarkable, and potentially disastrous electorally. 
 
To the extent that such ideological labels are still meaningful in the 21st Century, post-Blair 
Labour Party, Burnham was a centre-Left candidate, but genuflected to aspects of New 
Labour in an attempt to broaden his appeal to the Party. To this purpose, he simultaneously 
conceded that Labour had lost its 'emotional connection with millions of people', and in so 
doing, had not evinced sufficient interest in 'aspiration', nor acknowledged voters' concerns 
about issues such as immigration. However Burnham also argued that Labour had failed 'to 
explain and also defend our economic record. We didn't overspend through all our time in 
government' (Sky News, 9 June 2015), and insisted that Labour's 2015 manifesto was 'the 
best manifesto that I have stood on in four general elections.' As such, he sought to tread a 
fine line between acknowledging Labour's recent failings, while warning the Party 'not to 
distance ourselves from the last five years' (quoted in Bush, 2015).  
 
Meanwhile, Yvette Cooper is probably best classified as the centrist candidate, positioned 
between Burnham and Kendall, but whereas this ostensibly ought to have maximised her 
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appeal to median voters – a la Downs (1957) – among Labour's electorate, this perception 
merely obfuscated what she really stood for and believed in with regard to polices. For 
example, she simultaneously spoke of Labour's need to re-establish its credibility in the eyes 
of the business community, while urging the Party to be more vigorous in tackling child 
poverty and providing more child-care for working mothers. Cooper also spoke passionately 
of boosting the economy (and thus prosperity) through investment and innovation in science 
and technology. Ultimately, though, this quintessentially technocratic stance was hardly 
likely to enthuse and energise Party members and supporters, rather than encourage ennui.  
 
Crucially, Jeremy Corbyn was associated neither with New Labour and Blairism nor 
'Milibandism', and as such, could present himself as a candidate unsullied by the apparent 
betrayals, failures, and mistakes associated with Labour's previous leaders. More importantly, 
he was the only candidate who explicitly attacked austerity, and called instead for a growth 
strategy based on public investment, while also demanding a clamp-down on tax evasion. 
Corbyn also openly defended the welfare state, called for the abolition of [£9,000] student 
fees, opposed the renewal of Trident (Britain's nuclear submarines) and mooted the 
renationalisation of the railways, along with other forms of public ownership. It was an 
unashamedly Left-wing (at least when compared to 30 years of neo-liberalism) 'manifesto', 
and as such, an emphatic rebuttal of New Labour and 'Blairism'. 
 
 
Concerns over the integrity of the leadership contest 
 
Jeremy Corbyn's belated candidature, as the representative of Labour's Left, prompted a 
sudden surge in the number of people applying for 'registered supporter' status. Many of these 
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were doubtless individuals who were genuinely enthused by Corbyn and the ideological 
break with New Labour which he seemed to personify. Certainly, many of those who 
campaigned and canvassed for Corbyn, and attended his 'hustings' and other crowded public 
meetings and rallies at local level (Crines, 2015: 6), seemed to be former Labour Party 
members or supporters who had drifted away during Blair's leadership but now felt inspired 
to return, while a significant number of other Corbynites were new, often younger, 'registered 
supporters' who were similarly energised and enthused by his candidature, as we will discuss 
below when explaining the result.  
However, alongside these enthusiastic Corbynites who swelled the Party's ranks over the 
summer of 2015, there were alleged to have been two other types of 'registered supporters' 
who were a cause of much more concern to those supervising the leadership ballot, namely 
individuals who were not Labour supporters, but who wanted to secure Corbyn's victory for 
their own political motives; namely Right-wing Conservatives and radical Leftists. Some 
Conservatives were suspected of registering as Labour supporters solely in order to vote for 
Corbyn, in the hope of increasing his chances of victory, and thereby rendering the Labour 
Party unelectable due to being far too Left-wing.  
 
Concern about potential Conservative infiltration of Labour's leadership contest had initially 
been prompted by a campaign launched by The Daily Telegraph (15 July 2015), which 
encouraged its readers to: 'Sign up today to make sure the bearded socialist voter-repellent 
becomes the next Labour leader – and dooms the party forever', and which prompted a 
Twitter campaign '#ToriesForCorbyn'. One prominent Conservative commentator who 
heeded this advice was Toby Young, who confessed that he was motivated by a desire to 
'consign Labour to electoral oblivion’ (Young, 2015a; Young, 2015b). 
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However, the Conservatives' view of Corbyn as an atavistic throwback to the Bennite Left of 
the 1980s was shared by many of his critics in the Labour Party itself, particularly the 
Blairites. In their eyes, Corbyn was good at appealing to Left-wing activists and bien 
pensants always looking for an oppressed group or right-on cause to campaign for, but would 
pose absolutely no electoral threat to the Conservatives; indeed, would effectively guarantee 
the Conservatives’ victory in the 2020 general election, and quite possibly consign the 
Labour Party to Opposition for a generation, if not in perpetuity (Blair, 2015a; Blair, 2015b; 
Johnson, 2015; Mandelson, 2015).  
However, for some of Corbyn's opponents in the Labour Party, it was not so much 
Conservative infiltration which was a problem, but the likelihood of the hard-Left mobilising 
to vote for Corbyn. One (anonymous) Labour source alleged that not only was Corbyn 
‘sneaking in Green Party members by the back door’, but that a mass influx of new Party 
members or professed supporters, whose sole objective was to secure Corbyn’s victory, 
would be ‘completely illegitimate and on a par [with], if not worse than, the Militant 
infiltration in the 80s’ (quoted in Wintour and Perraudin, 2015).  
 
In the context of such allegations and concerns, there were calls from some Labour MPs and 
Party allies for the leadership contest to be halted, in order to check how many of those who 
had recently 'joined' the Party as affiliated or registered supporters were genuine, rather than 
being members of rival parties or organisations hostile to Labour, and whose applications 
were thus mischievous or malicious (Hope, 2015b: Lyons, 2015; Walker, 2015; Whitaker, 
2015). Such calls however, were firmly rejected, it being insisted that applications were 
already subject to robust checks, although it was not made clear precisely how such care and 
diligence was actually ensured.  
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Corbyn the conqueror (1): Where did Corbyn’s support emanate from? 
 
When the result was announced on 12 September, the scale of Corbyn's support was such that 
he won outright, without the need to distribute the second-preference votes of those who 
voted for Kendall, as illustrated in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: The result of Labour’s 2015 leadership contest; who voted for who? 
Candidate Total votes % of total 
votes 
Votes of 
Party 
members 
Votes of 
affiliated 
supporters 
Votes of 
'registered 
supporters' 
Andy 
Burnham 
80,462 19.0 55,698 
 
   18,604 
 
6,160 
Yvette 
Cooper 
71,928 17.0 54,470  
     9,043 
 
8,415 
Jeremy 
Corbyn 
 
251,417 
 
59.5 
 
  121,751 
   
 
41,217 
 
88,449 
Liz Kendall 18,857 4.5 13,601 
 
     2,682 
 
2,574 
Source: http://labourlist.org 
 
 
Not only was Corbyn the clear winner on the basis of first preference votes, he also polled 
many more votes than the other three candidates combined both among ‘affiliated’ supporters 
and ‘registered’ supporters. Indeed, among the latter, Corbyn’s 88,449 votes dwarfed the 
combined total of 17,149 received by the other three candidates. Meanwhile, his tally of votes 
among Labour Party members was more than double that which Andy Burnham and Yvette 
Cooper each attained, and virtually nine times as many as Liz Kendall attracted, although his 
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share of the vote among Party members was fractionally less than half, at 49.58% (compared 
to the 84% share he enjoyed among ‘registered’ supporters).  
 
Impressive though such a vote share undoubtedly was in a contest with four candidates, it 
does suggest that support for Corbyn was slightly more cautious or qualified among fully-
paid-up Labour Party members than the other two categories of members or supporters. 
Indeed, closer examination of the votes cast by Labour’s ‘full’ members – extrapolated from 
polling undertaken for The Times by YouGov – reveals interesting variations in the degree of 
support attracted by Corbyn, according to duration of Party membership. As Figure 2 clearly 
shows, support for Corbyn was lowest among longer-serving (pre-2010) Labour Party 
members, and highest among those who only became full members after the catastrophic 
defeat on 7 May. 
 
Figure 2: Support for Corbyn among full Labour Party members by length of membership  
                (%)       
 
  Member pre-May 2010    Joined under Ed Miliband     Joined after 2015 general election 
                  44                                      49                                                   62 
 
Source: YouGov/The Times, 15 September (https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/09/15/anatomy- 
             corbyns-victory/).      
 
 
However, as Corbyn did not officially become a leadership candidate until 15 June, it is 
apparent that not all of these new members joined primarily in order to vote for Corbyn 
(although many probably did support him subsequently). Instead, some of those who joined 
Labour in the aftermath of the general election doubtless did so because of a sense of shock 
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or outrage that the Conservatives had secured a surprise victory, following a slump in 
Labour's (exacerbated by a surge in support for the SNP), leaving the Party with 98 fewer 
parliamentary seats/MPs than the Conservative Party. This apparent desire to launch an 
immediate fight-back against the victorious Conservatives saw more than 20,000 people join 
the Labour Party in the first four days after the election defeat (taking total membership to 
just over 221,000), although other parties also enjoyed a post-election membership surge, 
including the decimated Liberal Democrats. By mid-August (the cut-off for applying for one 
of the three types of membership, prior to the start of the actual leadership ballot), Labour's 
'full' members totalled 300,000, alongside 140,000 affiliated supporters and 120,000 
registered supporters.  
 
Among those who joined the Labour Party as full members in the aftermath of the 2015 
electoral disaster, over 60 per cent voted for Corbyn, compared to the 44% who did so among 
the pre-2010 cohort of fully paid-up members. Meanwhile, although there were 20,000 more 
affiliated supporters than registered supporters, turnout was much higher in the latter category 
than the former - 93% to 48.5% - and it was among the latter that support for Corbyn was 
strongest: almost 84% of them voted for him, compared to just under 58% of affiliated 
supporters and fractionally fewer than half of full members (BBC, 2015b).       
 
Meanwhile, the YouGov survey also revealed that support for Corbyn was somewhat higher 
among the younger members of Labour’s 2015 electorate, as shown in Figure 3. Whereas 64 
and 67 per cent of the 18-24 and 25-39 age cohorts respectively supported Corbyn, barely 
half of the 60+ cohort did so.  
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Figure 3: Support for the candidates among Labour’s electorate, by age and gender (%). 
                                                                                
                                                      Age                                            Gender 
                              18-24      25-39      40-59       60+                Men      Women        
 
Burnham                  15           14           17           27                   19            19       
Cooper                     14           14           18           18                   18            16 
Corbyn                     64           67           60           51                   57            63      
Kendall                      6             4             5             3                     6              2  
Source: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/h4c7aqabu7/ 
             LabourSelectorate_TopLine_W.pdf 
 
It can also be seen that Corbyn was slightly more popular among women who were eligible to 
vote in the Labour leadership contest, by 63 per cent to 57. By contrast, only two per cent of 
women in Labour’s electorate voted for Liz Kendall, compared to six per cent of men.  
 
One other notable finding from this YouGov survey concerned the way that Labour’s 
affiliated and registered supporters had voted in the recent general election. As Figure 4 
shows, ‘only’ 60 per cent of the latter had actually voted Labour, whereas almost a quarter 
had opted for the Green Party, and five per cent of them had supported the Liberal 
Democrats. 
 
Figure 4: How Labour’s affiliated members and registered supporters voted in the 2015  
                general election (%) 
 
                                         Labour     Conservative    Lib Dem    Green      UKIP     Other 
 
Affiliated Members            76                   2                  4               12           2              3         
Registered supporters         60                   2                  5               24           2              5   
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Source: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/h4c7aqabu7/ 
             LabourSelectorate_TopLine_W.pdf 
 
A further two per cent each had voted for the Conservatives and UKIP respectively, and 
while these Conservative voters might well have paid their £3 fee solely in order to vote for 
Corbyn for mischievous reasons (namely to render Labour unelectable), it is conceivable that 
some of the UKIP voters were former Labour supporters who had been alienated by New 
Labour, and who genuinely hoped that a Corbyn-led Labour Party would prove more 
sympathetic and responsive to some of the concerns of the Party's erstwhile working-class 
supporters. After all, as Ford and Goodwin's seminal study notes, whilst it is commonly 
assumed 'that UKIP's voters are middle-class Tories ... there base is more working-class than   
that of any of the main parties', with many of these supporters being those who feel 'left 
behind' in an era of rapid socio-economic change and globalisation (Ford and Goodwin, 
2014: 153, 154).  
 
 
Corbyn the conqueror (2): Why did Corbyn receive so much support? 
 
It seemed rather ironic that a candidate who could not be described as flamboyant or a 
particularly notable orator – he often seemed quietly-spoken and rather unassuming – 
nonetheless attracted such adulation from many people, particularly among the young, who 
had previously become (or had already been) disillusioned with mainstream party politics, 
and always 'on-message' identikit party leaders. Yet for his supporters, in an age of vacuous 
celebrities and obsession with image, Corbyn's apparent 'ordinariness' was actually a large 
part of his appeal; they viewed it as 'authenticity', and thus evidence that he was not part of 
the 'Westminster bubble' which was itself contributing significantly to the public's increasing 
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loss of faith or trust in established (and 'Establishment') political elites. Of course, there was a 
certain irony in the fact that the enthusiasm which Corbyn inspired among many of his 
supporters, and the high turn-out at his public meetings, transformed him into something of a 
celebrity himself, albeit a reluctant one.       
 
Yet Corbyn’s election as Labour leader seems incongruous in the context of Stark’s three 
criteria for electing party leaders which we outlined earlier, particularly the importance of 
fostering party unity as a pre-requisite of rendering a party electorally credible, and inter alia 
promoting an image of leadership competence. This disjuncture is evident in Figure 5, which 
illustrates the personal qualities or political strengths which each candidate’s supporters 
attributed to them.  
 
Figure 5: Political attributes ascribed to each leadership candidate by those who supported  
                them (%)  
 
S/he…                                                           Burnham     Cooper     Corbyn     Kendall 
 
Will provide the best opposition                         
to the Conservatives                                          52             70              43             59  
Has the best policies for Britain                        29             35              70             36   
Has best chance of winning in 2020                  49             58                5             73         
Is a break from New Labour/Blair                     12              7               65               8  
Is a break from Ed Miliband’s Labour                5               4                 8             31           
Will unite the Labour Party                               48             34                5             10 
Source: YouGov/The Times, Labour Leadership (Day Two) 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/94enqtd1fz/LabourLeader
ship_150721_day_two_W.pdf. 
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For example, 48% of Andy Burnham's supporters envisaged him uniting the Labour Party, 
and 49% of them judged him likely to lead Labour to victory in the 2020 general election, 
while 58% of Yvette Cooper's supporters envisaged her leading Labour to victory in 2020.  
 
In sharp contrast, only 5% of Corbyn’s supporters expected him to unify the Labour Party, 
and the same nugatory number deemed him to have the best chance of securing Labour’s 
victory in 2020, yet 70% of his supporters deemed him to have the best policies for Britain. 
In other words, his own supporters acknowledged that Corbyn's 'correct’ policies would 
neither unite the Labour Party nor pave the way to electoral victory in 2020, and yet he still 
secured a remarkable victory.  
 
Clearly, Corbyn’s election as Labour Party leader represented the triumph of idealism and 
over more practical and pragmatic criteria for (s)electing Party leaders. Many of those who 
supported Corbyn would rather that the Labour Party adopted a much more 'principled' stance 
against the Conservatives and their continued neo-liberal policies, even if this consigned the 
Party to Opposition, than concede some ground to the Conservatives by accepting the need 
for austerity-driven policies such as welfare cuts for the poor and tax cuts for the rich. Indeed, 
for many Corbyn supporters, maintaining ideological purity in Opposition was infinitely 
preferable to what they perceived to be the 'betrayals' and 'sell-outs' symbolised by New 
Labour and the Blair Governments. Indeed, as Figure 5 also shows, heralding a decisive 
break with, and departure from, New Labour was another of Corbyn's key attributes 
according to many of those voting for him.  
 
Yet even before Corbyn’s supporters had finished celebrating, ominous mutterings were 
emanating from figures associated with New Labour, about how long Corbyn would be 
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permitted to remain Party leader before he was replaced. Although this might have been 
construed as a legitimate but speculative question, it was widely interpreted as a warning that 
Corbyn would face a direct challenge within a matter of months; in effect, a coup by 
disaffected and outraged Blairites to regain control of ‘their’ Party. As such, perhaps the most 
common question asked about Corbyn’s leadership has not been whether he can lead the 
Labour Party to victory in the 2020 general election, but for how long he will serve as Party 
leader before himself being challenged by MPs simultaneously aghast at his particular brand 
of full-blooded Socialism -  'Most Labour MPs think Corbyn’s politics are bonkers' (Kellner, 
2015: 39) - and alarmed at the Party’s consistently poll ratings, and its continued lack of 
economic or political credibility among voters (Helm, 2015; Helm, 2016; Kellner/YouGov, 
2015; Rawnsley, 2016; Savage, 2015; Wilkinson and Hughes, 2016).    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It was ironic that the 2014 abolition of Labour’s Electoral College, primarily to reduce the 
formal, but often controversial, role of the trade unions in the Party’s leadership contests, 
entailed creating new categories of voters, most notably that of ‘registered supporter’. While 
this constituted an understandable attempt at boosting Labour’s mass membership, and 
‘connecting’ with people who had not previously involved themselves with the Party, it also 
meant that these members would be able to play a major role in choosing the next Labour 
leader, even if they had only been registered for a few weeks, or even just a few days. There 
was no stipulated minimum length of membership or registered support before they became 
eligible to vote, and as such, Jeremy Corbyn attracted much of his support both from Labour 
supporters who had only registered since the general election defeat (albeit in some cases, 
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before Corbyn’s candidature had been confirmed), and ‘full’ members who had similarly 
joined the Party only after the crushing May defeat.  
 
Labour MPs were naturally aghast that a perennially rebellious Left-wing, CND-supporting, 
backbench rebel, with no Ministerial experience in his 32 years as an MP, and who was as 
likely to be found joining, or even addressing, a public rally or protest, as he was sitting on 
the green benches in the Commons, was elected as Labour leader, largely as a consequence of 
votes cast by 10,000s of individuals who had not even been members or registered supporters 
of the Party for more than a few weeks. Indeed, some of them had voted for other parties in 
the May 2015 election, most notably the Greens and the Liberal Democrats. 
 
From the outset, therefore, Corbyn struggled to establish his authority and legitimacy as Party 
leader, for the overwhelming majority of Labour MPs had never wanted him as leader, or 
even considered him to be a credible contender in the first place, and strongly disagreed with 
his radical Left-wing views. Even some of those Labour MPs who nominated Corbyn and 
initially welcomed his election subsequently confessed that 'we have come to regret that 
decision' (Cox and Coyle, 2016).  
 
Had the electorate for Labour's 2015 leadership contest been confined to the Party's 
parliamentarians and pre-May 2015 extra-parliamentary members, then Corbyn would 
probably not have been elected, for Stark's criteria of  ‘acceptability/unity’, ‘electability’ and 
‘competence’ would almost certainly have prevailed, and thus yielded a victory for either 
Andy Burnham or Yvette Cooper. However, the unforeseen influx of new members, in 
tandem with registered and affiliated supporters following the May 2015 general election 
defeat, significantly altered the political character and composition of the extra-parliamentary 
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party, with many of these new supporters proving to be motivated by other criteria when 
voting for Corbyn, most notably his ideological stance, purity of principles and policies. This 
was in spite of readily acknowledging that these characteristics would be highly unlikely to 
unify the Labour Party or deliver victory in the 2020 general election.  
 
More generally, this clearly highlights a perennial dilemma accruing from the extension of 
intra-party democracy and the associated commitment to increasing Party membership: the 
extra-parliamentary members and rank-and-file activists might well adopt a different 
definition of who or what constitutes a 'good' leader, and thus vote for someone who is 
neither supported nor respected by the Party's parliamentarians - or the country's electorate.    
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